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ABSTRACT
A geo-marketplace allows users to be paid for their location data.
Users concerned about privacy may want to charge more for data
that pinpoints their location accurately, but may charge less for data
that is more vague. A buyer would prefer to minimize data costs, but
may have to spend more to get the necessary level of accuracy. We
call this interplay between privacy, utility, and price spatial privacy
pricing. We formalize the issues mathematically with an example
problem of a buyer deciding whether or not to open a restaurant
by purchasing location data to determine if the potential number
of customers is sufficient to open. The problem is expressed as a
sequential decision making problem, where the buyer first makes
a series of decisions about which data to buy and concludes with
a decision about opening the restaurant or not. We present two
algorithms to solve this problem, including experiments that show
they perform better than baselines.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Economics of security and privacy;
• Information systems→ Geographic information systems;
• Computing methodologies→ Planning under uncertainty.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The current business model of many major technology companies
is to provide free services to users in return for their data. Often
the services and data are based on location. These freely acquired
datasets are then used for various targeted advertising purposes,
which in turn pay for the services developed and offered by the
company. In addition, sometimes the companies simply sell the
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users’ data to third parties and make a profit. These third parties
may be interested in gathering information from certain locations.
For example, public health authorities can use the data to identify
potential pandemic clusters; city authorities are interested in travel
patterns during heavy traffic; or advertisers are interested in the
popularity of various locations at different times. The Location Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 2012 [1] tried to address this data collecting
and sharing practice. It requires any company that obtains location
information from a customer’s smartphone to get that customer’s
express consent before collecting the location data, as well as before
sharing the location data with third parties. However, the current
practice is that if a user wants to hide her location data from a
service provider, she has to turn off her location-detection device
and (temporarily) unsubscribe from the service.
Figure 1: The true location x (black dot) can be sold as one
of the noisy data points z1, z2 (white dots). The standard de-
viation σ1 of noise of z1 is smaller than that of z2. Hence, z1
is more expensive than z2.
Recently, an alternative framework is emerging to create data
marketplaces through which data owners offer their location data
to potential buyers [10], dubbed a geo-marketplace [13]. Data mar-
ketplaces raise a number of interesting issues about data ownership,
utility, pricing and privacy. Focusing on geo-marketplaces in this
paper, we study the interplay between location data utility, privacy
and value (i.e., pricing).
To illustrate, consider our running example scenario: a buyer
is interested in checking if the number of people inside a target
region R is large enough to, say, open a restaurant in R (utility).
Determining whether the population is sufficiently large in a given
area is also important for a number of decision making applications
such as identifying pandemic hotspots, opening COVID-19 test
centers, expanding public transportation, opening new community
services (e.g. youth centers) and representative government.
Suppose the geo-marketplace has locations of many users, where
each user’s location can be sold at different levels of accuracy cor-
responding to her privacy vs. price preferences. There are different
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approaches to capture privacy or inaccuracy. For our purpose, and
to simplify the discussion, we assume privacy or inaccuracy is cap-
tured as a data point with a Gaussian noise level represented by
the standard deviation of the noise distribution. 1 In Figure 1, for
example, a user’s true location at x can be sold as noisy points with
mean and standard deviation (z1,σ1) for $1 or (z2,σ2) for $2.
The buyer can purchase data frommultiple users and/or multiple
times from one user at different levels of accuracy. After making
a decision of “open" the restaurant or “cancel" (i.e. not open), the
buyer would receive a net profit equal to the corresponding revenue
of the decision minus the cost of purchasing data. The buyer’s
objective is to maximize this profit.
Maximizing the profit is challenging for the buyer for several
reasons. First, the locations of users are uncertain, and the buyer
can only reduce this uncertainty by purchasing more data. Second,
the purchasing actions are irrevocable (i.e. the buyer cannot ask for
reimbursement after already buying the data), so the purchasing
action may not be optimal in hindsight. And third, although the
problem can be modelled as a partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP), with locations as state and observations and
possibly prices as actions, the large number of users and the con-
tinuous nature of the domain spaces render the standard POMDP
solutions impractical due to the explosion of the number of states.
Some seemingly obvious solutions are not always effective. For
example, buying the most accurate data from all users may exceed
the payoff for making the correct open/cancel decision, resulting
in a negative profit. Alternatively, spending a fixed, prespecified
amount on purchasing raises the issue of predetermining that fixed
amount. Therefore, there is a need for an adaptive approach to this
problem. Other studies have attempted to find adaptive solutions
to similar problems. However, they either considered a simpler
version of this problem [16] or had different objectives [6, 8, 9, 14],
thus, resulting in inapplicable solutions. Finally, the approaches
for location privacy protection such as spatial cloaking [18], differ-
ential privacy [5] or Geo-Indistinguishablity [3] are relevant but
orthogonal to our work as we discuss in Section 2.2. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to consider the interplay be-
tween privacy, utility and price in a data marketplace, particularly
in geo-marketplaces, with the focus on the profit of buyers.
We develop two adaptive algorithms to help buyers optimize the
buying actions to obtain necessary data for a decision while striving
to reduce the data acquisition cost, called the spatial information
probing (SIP) algorithm and the SIP algorithm with terminals (SIP-
T). Our algorithms take into account the uncertainty in the data,
the irrevocability of the collection process and the large number
of users’ possible locations. Both algorithms start by buying data
at a lower price (dubbed probing) in order to gather information,
then continue to buy at higher prices the data points that have
high potential to give high profit. These algorithms use the expected
incremental profit (EIP), which intuitively is the expected increment
of the expected profit when purchasing a data point at a price, to
choose the next data point and the next price at which to buy. SIP-
T enhances SIP by taking into account the distance of purchased
1This can be simply extended to use more sophisticated location privacy mechanisms
such as Geo-Indistinguishablity [3].
data from the target region and focusing more on distinguishing
whether a data point is inside or outside the target region.
Specifically, our contributions are:
• Proposing the problem of balancing the benefits for users
and buyers in data marketplaces in terms of privacy, utility
and price. In the spatial data marketplace, we called this
problem spatial privacy pricing.
• Presenting a specific application in which buyers optimize
their purchasing actions to obtain necessary data for a deci-
sion while trying to reduce the data acquisition cost.
• Developing adaptive algorithms which take into account
multiple obstacles such as uncertainty of the data, the irre-
vocability of the collection process and the large range of
possible locations of users. Our algorithms adaptively buy
different data points at difference prices based on the EIP
and the geometry of the purchased data.
• Extensive experiments comparing our algorithms to base-
lines over different settings for users’ data, buyers’ decisions
and algorithmic parameters.
2 PROBLEM SETTING
In this section, we formalize the problem of the buyer deciding to
open or cancel a restaurant in a target region R in order to demon-
strate different aspects of the spatial privacy pricing problem: pri-
vacy, utility and value (i.e. pricing). We start by defining the notion
of privacy valuation of users. We then introduce privacy pricing,
which serves as the fundamental mechanism to balance the benefits
for users and buyers. Then, we present the decision problem of the
buyer, which involves purchasing data from users using the privacy
pricing mechanism. Finally, we formalize our problem setting.
2.1 Users’ Privacy Valuation
In a data marketplace, the privacy concern or valuation of users
can be quantified with three components: their general privacy
concern, their concern for a specific data point and their concern
about a specific buyer. We present a simple model that captures
these three aspects in a straightforward way.
For general privacy valuation, we assume each user ui has an
overall privacy level ρi ≥ 0 which reflects the user’s own valuation
of their privacy and is independent between users. This reflects
Westin’s series of privacy surveys, where he categorized privacy
concerns of people as high, moderate and low [11].
Each data point xi, j of user ui can have its own sensitivity νi, j ≥
0, which is independent of ρi and independent between data points.
Sensitivity νi, j reflects how sensitive ui feels about xi, j , e.g. a gas
station vs. a hospital.
For different buyers, users might also have a different level of
trust ζb , e.g., an unknown developer may deserve less trust than the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In this work, since we
start with a single buyer with a specific query, we consider ζb = 1.
Subsequently, the total privacy valuation λi, j,b of user ui for
their data xi, j for a buyer b would be a function of ρi , νi, j and ζb
λi, j,b = ρiνi, jζb (1)
When the user has only one data point, we simply use λi = λi, j,b .
For simplicity, we use λi in the remaining discussion. A user with
2
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a higher privacy valuation would expect to receive higher value
for their location information. Next we discuss how λi affects the
price of the users’ location data.
2.2 Privacy Pricing
One popular approach to protect users’ privacy when releasing
data is by adding noise, either directly to the data or to some com-
ponents of the data release process. In this work, Gaussian noise is
added with the magnitude represented by the standard deviation
σ dependent on the price paid. The noise magnitude or standard
deviation σ is considered as the noise level.
When a data point xi is traded at a price qi , the noise magnitude
σi is given as a function of qi and λi as follows
σi =
{
λi
qi kσ : 0 < qi < λi
0 : λi < qi
(2)
where kσ is a scaling factor to make the resulting σi match with the
real-world values of the noise magnitude, discussed in Section 5.4.
This is one possible model that captures the essence of privacy and
price. A higher price qi reduces σi , while a higher privacy valuation
λi increases σi . The privacy valuation λi can be viewed as the price
the user ui wants in order to sell their unperturbed data.
Although our users’ pricing and privacy models need real-world
evaluation, they capture the essence of our model and permit the
full development and testing of our proposed algorithms. The func-
tioning of the algorithms is unaffected by the particular pricing
and privacy models. For example, other privacy preserving frame-
works, such as spatial cloaking [18], differential privacy [5] or Geo-
Indistinguishability [3], could also be used instead of the Gaussian
noise. In that case, the parameters in those frameworks, e.g. ϵ in
differential privacy, can be derived from a function ϵ = f1(qi ) of
the price qi with a similar or more complicated pricing model. The
noise level σi then can be derived from a function σi = f2(ϵ) of
those parameters. Eventually the noise level σi can still be con-
sidered as a function σi = f (qi ) = f1
(
f2(qi )
)
of the price. The
work on specific privacy-preserving techniques or pricing models
is orthogonal to our work. Consequently, in this presentation, we
assume the privacy valuation of users and the pricing function are
fixed, and we focus on the problem of the buyers maximizing their
total reward (i.e. profit) with the strategy to make the final open or
cancel decision described in the next section.
2.3 The Buyer’s Profit Maximization Problem
In order to finally decide to open or cancel (i.e. not open) a restaurant
in the target region R, the buyer can take a sequence of actions
a = {a1,a2, . . . ,aT }, where taking an action a would give the buyer
a reward or profit r (a). The goal of the buyer is to maximize the
expected total profit of the chosen actions
maxE[r (a)] = maxE[
T∑
t=1
r (at )] (3)
where the expectation is over the (possibly) noisy data from users
and the randomness of the process of choosing actions.
There are two types of actions that at can represent: open/cancel
ao actions and buying ab actions. The buyer can take multiple
buying actions to gather information before ultimately deciding to
take an open/cancel action. Therefore, the last action aT must be an
open/cancel actionao and other actions a1:T−1 = {a1,a2, . . . ,aT−1}
must be buying actions ab.
An open/cancel action ao can take one of the two possible values
in the set Ao = {open, cancel}, which mean open or not open a
restaurant, respectively. The profit of an opening action ao is
r (ao) =
{
βn − c i f ao = open
0 i f ao = cancel
(4)
where β is the profit per user (or the gross margin), n is the number
of users in the region R that may visit the restaurant and c is some
fixed cost for opening the restaurant, for example, the monthly rent
or the cost of operation. Naturally, more users leads to a higher
profit. This form of the profit function in Equation 4 can capture
other variations of the buyer’s profit in our problem. For example,
the buyer may decide to open only if r (open) > r0, then c can be set
as c ← c+r0. In another example, when the buyer decides to cancel,
one may consider the buyer losing a fraction −β/k of the profit for
each user inside R as some opportunity cost. This variation can be
captured by setting β ← (1 + 1k )β .
Each buying action ab requires the buyer to purchase a data
point xi at some price q > 0. For clarity, we denote this buying
action as ab(i,q). The set Ab of all possible buying actions includes
all data points at all possible prices. The profit for this action ab(i,q)
is the negative of the price the buyer needs to pay, which means
r (ab(i,q)) = −q (5)
Thus r (a1:T−1) can be considered as the cost of buying data.
In addition to r (ab(i,q)), after taking ab(i,q), the buyer will also
receive a noisy data point zi whose coordinates are the true co-
ordinate of xi perturbed by independent Gaussian noise with σi
derived from the price q using Equation 2, which means
zi = xi + η, η ∼ N(0,σ 2i I ) (6)
where I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix .
In this work, the number of actions T the buyer can take is not
restricted. In addition, the buyer focuses on their business problem
and is honest with the use of data. The buyer is also not restricted
by any budget for purchasing data because an excessive cost of
purchasing data will eventually decrease the net profit.
2.4 Formal Definition
For simplicity, we consider a snapshot in time of users’ locations
and assume each user has only one data point xi at that time with
sensitivity νi . (Note that this same point could be sold multiple
times at different levels of accuracy.) The setting would be similar
to the case of multiple data points with minor changes. With all the
quantities defined, we can formalize the problem setting as follows:
Given a snapshot in time of locations of N users where each user
ui is at location xi ∈ R2, has privacy valuation λi and is willing to
trade xi at different prices qi , the buyer’s objective is to maximize
the expected total profit of an action sequence a = {a1,a2, . . . ,aT }
where aT ∈ Ao,ai ∈ Ab ∀i = 1, ..,T − 1:
maxE[r (a)] = maxE[
T∑
t=1
r (at )] (7)
3
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3 RELATEDWORK
The concept of marketplaces for geosocial data was proposed in [10].
In [2], the authors investigated the value of spatial information
to guide the purchases of the buyer. In [13], a geo-marketplace
was proposed where location data are protected using searchable
encryption. However, their setting only consider buying data points
at full price, while in our setting one data point can be sold multiple
times at different levels of accuracy for different prices. Singla [16]
also studied the problem of maximizing the buyer’s profit when
information is available at a price, but also can only be purchased
at full price, which can be considered as a simpler form of our
problem and is used as a baseline in our experiments. In [9], Gupta
et. al extends on the capability of purchasing the same data multiple
times. However, they focus on maximizing the total profit, while the
objective in our problem is to make a binary decision. In addition,
although their method provides some theoretical guarantees of the
performance, it relies on the grades of states of Markov decision
processes that are infeasible to compute in our problem.
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) is
a powerful framework for modelling sequential decision making
processes under uncertainty with the goal of maximizing total re-
ward. POMDPs have been an active research area and considerable
progress has been made on solving POMDPs [4, 15, 17]. While our
problem setting can be considered as a POMDP with continuous
state, observation and action spaces, our problem also includes a
large number of users. Since the number of possible states in this
POMDP increases exponentially with the number of users, standard
POMDP algorithms are computationally infeasible for our problem.
There are also several studies on selling privacy [6, 8, 14]. How-
ever, they focus on the accuracy of the inferred number of users
compared to the true number, while our focus is on the sufficiency
of that number for making a binary decision which may incur some
cost itself. In their setting, data points are also only purchased once,
compared to possibly multiple times in our setting.
Many privacy-preserving techniques have been proposed for
location privacy such as spatial cloaking [18], differential privacy [5,
20] or Geo-Indistinguishablity [3]. These techniques can be applied
as the privacy protection mechanism for users’ locations in our
framework and a pricing model can be derived based on the param-
eters of these mechanisms, as discussed in Section 2.2. Therefore,
while relevant, these techniques are orthogonal to our work.
4 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first describe the strategy the buyer would em-
ploy to make the open/cancel decision. Given such an open/cancel
strategy, we define the expected incremental profit (EIP) which
serves as the basis for our spatial information probing techniques,
the SIP and SIP-T algorithms.
4.1 The Buyer’s Strategy to Make Open/Cancel
Decision
Recall that each buying action ab(i,q) gives the buyer a noisy data
point zi . The noisy data obtained from the buying actions a1:T−1
can help the buyer to make the open/cancel action aT as follows.
Assume that after taking actions a1:T−1, the buyer owns a set of
noisy data Z. If there is more than one version of zi from user i ,
the buyer keeps only the most accurate. Then, from the buyer’s
perspective, given zi , the true location xi has the distribution
xi ∼ N(zi ,σ 2i I ) (8)
The probability pi of the user ui being inside R is
pi =
∫
R
P(xi )dxi (9)
Considering each pi as the success probability of an independent
Bernoulli trial, the probability distribution P(n |Z) of the number of
users inside region R would be a Poisson binomial distribution [19]
with mean as follows:
µn =
∑
i
pi (10)
Given this distribution, the current expected profit for open/cancel
actions are E[r (open)] = βµn − c and E[r (cancel)] = 0. If the buyer
decides to make an open/cancel decision at time T , i.e. aT is an
open/cancel action ao, the best action aT would be
aT =
{
open if βµn − c > 0
cancel if otherwise
(11)
Assume that the buyer starts with an empty set of data, which
gives µn = 0. Then, E[r (open)] = −c . Adding an additional pi to µn
in Equation 10 increases µn . Thus by buying more data, the estimate
of µn increases, thus increasing E[r (open)]. Therefore, the buyer
would want to buy data to increase E[r (open)] while also trying to
decrease the cost
∑T−1
t=1 r (at ). The buyer would stop buying when
they can be confident of making the open decision, i.e. βµn − c > 0
or when buying more data, in expectation, would not give more
benefit. Thus, βµn − c > 0 can be considered as the open trigger for
the buyer. We call βµn − c > 0 the opening condition.
4.2 The Expected Incremental Profit (EIP)
With the strategy to make the open/cancel decision established,
we introduce the expected incremental profit EIP(Z,a) of taking a
buying action a with the current set Z of purchased noisy data.
EIP(Z,a) would then serve as the criteria for the buyer to choose
a buying action in our algorithms.
To develop EIP(Z,a), we first calculate the expected profit if the
buyer takes ao = open immediately given the current noisy dataZ
E[r (open)|Z] = β
∑
i
pi − c (12)
If the buyer takes a buying action a = ab(i,q) and obtains a new
noisy data point z′i from the same user with the new probability
p′i of xi ∈ R, replacing the current noisy data zi inZ with z′i , the
expected profit of open is
E[r (open)|Z, z′i ] = β
(
p′i +
∑
j,i
pj
) − c − q (13)
and the incremental profit is:
IP(Z,a, z′i ) = E[r (open)|Z, z′i ] − E[r (open)|Z] = β(p′i − pi ) − q
If zi does not exist inZ (i.e. xi was never purchased before), pi = 0.
Since p′i is unknown before we actually perform the buying
action a = ab(i,q), we can calculate the expected incremental profit
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for taking the buying action a = ab(i,q) given the current noisy
dataZ as follows:
EIP(Z,a) = Ez′i [IP(Z,a, z
′
i )] (14)
= Ez′i [β(p
′
i − pi ) − q] (15)
= βEz′i [p
′
i |zi ,σi ,q] − βpi − q (16)
= β
∫
R2
P(z′i |zi ,σi ,q)p′i (z′i )dz′i − βpi − q (17)
where R is the real domain and
p′i (z′i ) =
∫
R
P(xi )dxi (18)
xi ∼ N(z′i ,σ ′2i I ) (19)
The distribution P(z′i |zi ,σi ,q) of the new noisy point z′i if we
takes action a = ab(i,q) is the convolution of two distributions: the
distribution xi |zi ,σi ∼ N(zi ,σ 2i I ) of the true location xi given the
current noisy data zi and the distribution z′i |xi ,q ∼ N(0,σ ′2i I ) of
the next noisy data z′i generated from the true location xi where
σ ′i is the noise magnitude for xi at the price q. This means the
distribution P(z′i |zi ,σi ,q) is
z′i |zi ,σi ,q ∼ N
(
zi , (σ 2i + σ ′2i )I
)
(20)
The buyer can then choose the next buying action as the action
that maximizes the expected incremental profit:
a∗(Z) = argmax
a
EIP(Z,a) (21)
With EIP(Z,a), we develop two algorithms to help the buyer maxi-
mize their profit while maintaining a low purchasing cost.
4.3 The Spatial Information Probing
Algorithms
We present two greedy algorithms that are based on the probing
(or information gathering) technique. The general idea is to utilize
the continuity of the price to obtain noisy data at low cost first
in order to quickly eliminate uninteresting data before paying a
higher price for more accurate data. The two algorithms are called
spatial information probing (SIP) and SIP with terminals (SIP-T).
4.3.1 The SIP Algorithm. The pseudo-code for SIP is shown in
Algorithm 1. SIP has two phases: the first phase is a pure exploration
phase and the second phase is an exploration-exploitation phase.
In the first phase, the buyer would buy all available data points
in a large bounding box around the target region R at a small
starting price q0 (lines [2-9]). Then in the second phase (lines [10-
30]), the buyer repeatedly calculates EIPs (lines [10-13]), takes a
buying action based on the high potential EIPs (line [15, 27]) and
uses the newly purchased noisy data, if any, to guide the next
action (line [19, 29]). After each purchase, the buyer also checks the
opening condition described in Section 4.1. The buyer would stop
buying if the best EIP value is negative (line 16) which means that
in expectation, buying more data would not increase the profit.
Algorithm 1 The SIP Algorithm
Input: UsersU; region R; β ; c; starting price q0; price increment
factor h;
Output: open or cancel
1: Z ← ∅; V ← 0; E ← {};
2: for xi ∈ U do
3: zi ← Buy xi at price q0
4: Z ← Z ∪ zi ; pi ← P(xi ∈ R |zi )
5: V ← V + βpi
6: if V − c > 0 then
7: return open
8: end if
9: end for
10: for zi ∈ Z do
11: a ← argmax
a
EIP(zi ,a) (Algorithm 2)
12: E[a] ← EIP(zi ,a)
13: end for
14: while true do
15: ab(i,q) ← argmaxa E[a]
16: if E[ab(i,q)] ≤ 0 then
17: return cancel
18: end if
19: Delete E[ab(i,q)]
20: z′i ← Buy xi at price q
21: Z ← (Z \ zi ) ∪ z′i
22: pi ← P(xi ∈ R |zi )
23: p′i ← P(xi ∈ R |z′i )
24: V ← V − βpi + βp′i
25: if V − c > 0 then
26: return open
27: end if
28: a ← argmax
a
EIP(zi ,a) (Algorithm 2)
29: E[a] ← EIP(zi ,a)
30: end while
Algorithm 2 Find The Best Next Buying Action
Input: z; λi ; current price q; price increment factor h;
Output: Best next buying action a∗
1: v ← −∞
2: while q < λi do
3: q ← min(q × h, λi )
4: if v < EIP(z,ab(i,q)) then
5: a∗ ← ab(i, λi )
6: v ← EIP(z,a∗)
7: end if
8: end while
return a∗
Because EIP(Z,a) only depends on zi , not any other noisy points,
we use EIP(zi ,a) = EIP(Z,a) as ab(i,q) clearly specifies zi . Also, to
reduce computation time, whenever the buyer calculates EIPs, the
buyer keeps track of the best next buying action a for each noisy
data point zi and its corresponding value of EIP (line 12 and 29).
This best next action is calculated using Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 chooses the best next buying action for a noisy data
point zi given the most recent purchased price q and a price incre-
ment factor h. Even though one can try to calculate the EIP(zi ,a) for
all possible prices in [q, λi ], it would be computationally impractical.
In addition, the next price which gives the highest EIP(zi ,a)may be
too close to q to be informative enough (i.e. significant change in pi )
to make good progress. To overcome these obstacles, Algorithm 2
operates in multiple rounds and increases the potential price in
each round by a factor h until the potential price is at least λi . The
factor h allows the next purchase for xi to be significantly more
informative than the current zi , besides reducing computation.
4.3.2 The SIP-T Algorithm. One issue with SIP is that, for xi that
is actually inside R but closer to the edges, the first low-price pur-
chases may give unexpectedly low values for the probability of xi
being inside R, making the increment in the expected profit become
smaller than the next price. This issue may cause the highest value
of EIP(zi ,a) to be negative, thus, SIP may stop buying earlier than
expected. We propose the SIP-T algorithm to address this issue.
SIP-T defines a terminal belief (or terminal) τi for each data
point xi and only stops buying when either all data points are in
their terminals or the opening condition is satisfied. The terminal τi
specifies that the buyer can be certain about whether xi is inside R
or not. The terminating condition determines if zi is at τi .
Although a threshold for pi can be used for the terminating con-
dition (e.g. pi < 0.05), the high-magnitude noise when purchasing
data at low prices make this approach ineffective. Instead, SIP-T
uses the standard deviation σi of the noise to check for the terminat-
ing condition. More specifically, for a noisy data point zi with the
standard deviation σi of the noise, zi is at τi if in each dimension
zi is either (1) inside R with the distance to each edge at least kσi
or (2) outside R with the distance to the closest edge at least kσi .
We arbitrarily choose k = 2.
With the terminal condition defined as above, SIP-T is SIP with
two changes. The first change is that, in line 16, it returns cancel
when E = ∅ instead of E[ab(i,q)] ≤ 0. The second change is that
after buying a data point and updating the expected profit in line 27,
it checks for the terminating condition, and if the condition holds, it
immediately continues to the next purchase round (line 14) instead
of calculating next best buying action for that data point.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We experimentally evaluate our probing algorithms on a real-world
dataset with various settings for users’ data, the buyer’s decisions
and algorithmic parameters.
5.1 Datasets
We experiment on the Gowalla dataset from the SNAP project 2 with
6,442,890 check-ins of 196,591 users over the period of February
2009 to October 2010. Each check-in includes a user id, check-in
time, latitude and longitude.
We collect check-ins within a Los Angeles boundary defined by
a bounding box from a southwest corner at (-118.684687, 33.699675)
to northeast corner (-118.144458, 34.342324) in degrees of latitude
2https://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-gowalla.html
and longitude. We then keep only one random check-in per user,
which results in a subset of 5827 check-ins.
The radian (lat, long) coordinates are then converted to a lo-
cally planar Cartesian coordinate system with the mid-point of the
latitude/longitude bounding box as the reference point. The bound-
ing box in local Euclidean coordinates (x ,y) is from the southwest
corner at (-25,000, -35,000) to the the northeast corner at (25,000,
35,000) in meters. Figure 2 shows the check-ins in Los Angeles area
within the bounding box.
Figure 2: Check-ins of Gowalla users in Los Angeles con-
verted to local Euclidean coordinates, 1 check-in per user.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
To avoid any bias towards any position of the target region R,
we evaluate performance of each algorithm over a collection of
regions R. Our collection of regions is a grid over the bounding box.
Each cell of the grid is considered as a target region for making an
open/cancel decision. The evaluation metrics includes the Average
Realized Profit (ARP), the Median Realized Profit (MRP) and the
Recall as explained in the following.
The ARP and MRPmetrics. For each target region R ∈ R, the
net profit of the buyer’s action sequence aR is r (aR ), calculated
using Equation 7. Then ARP and MRP are defined as the mean
and median values of {r (aR )|R ∈ R}. The reason we use MRP, in
addition to ARP, is because there are often a few popular regions
that have many users and become outliers in term of ARP since
opening a restaurant there can yield extremely high profit compared
to other regions. MRP is more robust to the effect of outliers and, as
discussed later, can better reflect the cost spent by each algorithm.
Recall. Given the ground truth data, for each target region R, if
the opening condition holds/does not hold for R, R is considered
as a positive/negative region. Similarly, the value open/cancel of the
open/cancel action aoR is considered as positive/negative decision.
Consequently, recall can be calculated for the set {aoR |R ∈ R} as
the ratio of the positive regions the algorithm can find.
5.3 Baselines
We compare our algorithms to several baselines. As mentioned in
Section 3, since standard POMDP algorithms are computationally
infeasible for our problem, we do not consider them as baselines.
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The first baseline is the Oracle algorithm which simply knows
the most accurate location data of all users. Oracle is used as a
benchmark to show the maximum value of each metric that any al-
gorithm can achieve, even though this is unlikely since an algorithm
usually needs to purchase data in order to make an open/cancel
decision and the price of purchasing data may surpass the profit.
The second baseline is the utility maximization algorithm in [16],
referred here as the PoI algorithm. With PoI, each point xi is as-
signed a value (called a “grade"), which is the extra expected profit
ve such that the expected profit the buyer may earn by buying xi
at a certain price to obtain new noisy data is the same as the ex-
pected profit from stopping buying xi and receiving ve . The grade
ve is calculated based on the price of xi , the profit per user β and a
uniform probability of xi being inside the region R. PoI then ranks
data points based on their grades and then repeatedly buys data
points at full price until the maximum grade is non-positive or the
opening condition holds.
The other baseline is the Fixed Maximum Cost (FMC) algorithm
that spends a fixed amount to buy all data points at the same price.
As mentioned, the challenge with the FMC is how to predict the
fixed amount. We used 0.1%, 1% and 2% of the fixed cost c to derive
three variations, called FMC-0.1, FMC-1 and FMC-2, respectively.
5.4 Parameter Setup
The gross margin per user β is set to β ∈ {50, 100, 150, 200} in US
dollars. The values are chosen based on the annual gross margin of
some fast food chains such as Starbucks, McDonald’s or Del Taco,
divided by their total number of customers, which can be found
in their annual reports. The bold value indicates the default value
used in the experiments where this parameter is fixed.
Instead of fixing values for the fixed cost c , which is difficult to
know in the real world, we consider the ration0 = c/β which can be
seen as the minimum number of users that the buyer would need to
open, because if n > n0, then βn > c , which means the opening con-
dition holds. We call this ratio theminimum user threshold and set it
to n0 ∈ {200, 300, 400, 500, 600}. These values are derived from [7]
where the authors showed that the average number of restaurants
was 2.3 (SD, 1.8) per 1,000 residents in Los Angeles County, yielding
about 435 residents per restaurant. When β is fixed at 100, these
values yield c ∈ {20,000, 30,000, 40,000, 50,000, 60,000}.
For users’ privacy valuation, we simulate the privacy level and
sensitivity values from two uniform distributions ρi ∼ Unif (0,d)
and νi, j ∼ Unif (0,d) then multiply them to get λi = ρiνi, j . These
distributions mean that each user has general privacy levels from 0
to d , and their own data points have sensitivity levels from 0 to d .
The scale d is set to d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
For the size of the regions R, we experimented with different L×L
region sizes with L ∈ {2,500, 5,000, 7,500, 10,000} meters, which
creates from 35 to 560 regions in the test grid. These values are
derived from the study [12].
For the parameters of SIP and SIP-T, the starting price q0 is set
to q0 ∈ {0.0001, 0.001, 0.002, 0.003, 0.004}, and the price increment
factor h is set to h ∈ {1.5, 2, 3.5, 5} to reflect small and large in-
crement factors. The scaling factor kσ is fixed at kσ = 20, which
would render the standard deviation of noise to be {20, 40, 80, . . . }
for the ratio λiq = {1, 0.5, 0.25, . . . }. These values are close to the
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Figure 3: The effect of the minimum user threshold n0
noise magnitude of real-world location noise such as GPS, Wi-Fi or
cell towers. Finally, the experiments for each region is executed in
a single core of an Intel® CoreTM i9-9980XE CPU.
5.5 Experimental Results
5.6 The effect of profit model parameters
5.6.1 The minimum customer threshold n0. We first show in Fig-
ure 3 the effect of the minimum customer threshold n0. SIP and
SIP-T consistently outperform other algorithms in most cases.
The average realized profit (ARP) decreases when n0 increases,
since there are fewer regions that have enough users to open a
restaurant (Figure 3(a)). However, while the ARP of other algo-
rithms sharply decreases, SIP and SIP-T maintain their performance
compared to Oracle. Note that Oracle is assumed to know the accu-
rate data of all users. The actual cost to obtain such accurate data is
about 1.8 millionUSD. Besides, although ARP of FMC-1 is sometimes
similar to that of SIP and SIP-T, we emphasize that FMC comes with
no principles for deciding how much to spend. Therefore, in some
scenarios, it just got lucky. For example, FMC can easily suffer from
underspending (such as FMC-0.1) or overspending (such as FMC-2).
The median realized profit (MRP) further demonstrates the supe-
riority of SIP and SIP-T compared to other algorithms (Figure 3(b)).
Since the decision for the majority of the regions in the grid should
be cancel, Oracle has a zero MRP and other algorithms have nega-
tive MRPs, which are the median amount they spent on purchasing
data. MRP values of SIP and SIP-T are stable and several times
higher than those of other algorithms, except for FMC-0.1 which
was underspending.
While often spending much less than the other algorithms, SIP
and SIP-T can still make correct open decisions for the regions
where the buyer should decide open. This is shown in Table 3(c)
where recall of SIP and SIP-T is comparable to FMC-1 and FMC-2
which spent significantly more.
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Figure 4: Illustrations for the amount spent by the SIP
The reason for the superior performance of SIP and SIP-T are
their highly adaptive nature: adaptive to the number of users in
the target region and to the position of each data point relative
to the target region. Figure 4 illustrates the amount SIP spent for
each region against the true number of users (Figure 4(a)) and
for each data point (Figure 4(b)). The amount spent tends to be
higher for regions that have the true number of users closer to the
minimum user threshold and higher for data points closer to the
edges of a target region. This is because the true state being inside
or outside a region is harder to identify for users closer to the edge,
thus requiring more accurate data, which costs more. Although PoI
dynamically decides which data point to buy, it does not perform
well compared to SIP and SIP-T because it bought data at full price.
While SIP and SIP-T have comparable ARP, SIP has a higher
MRP but a lower recall than that of SIP-T. This is because SIP-T
continues to buy a data point at higher accuracy even though the
EIP of the data point can be negative. Hence SIP-T would spend
more than SIP but have more accurate location information.
The general trade-off is that spending more money buys more
accurate data, which helps make more accurate open/cancel deci-
sions. However, spending excessively may decrease the final profit,
because the high cost of purchasing data may surpass the profit. SIP
and SIP-T are two alternatives that balance this trade-off with dif-
ferent foci: on the expected profit per data point vs. distinguishing
whether a data point is inside or outside the target region.
5.6.2 The profit per user β . The effect of the gross margin (or
gross profit) per user β is shown in Figure 5. As β increases, the
buyer can gain more per user, thus, gaining higher ARP. However,
as minimum user threshold n0 is fixed, when β increases, c also
increases, thus, increasing the amount the FMC-based algorithm
spends. That is why MRP decreases for the FMC-based algorithms.
With a higher value of β , the EIP of a data point at a price
also increases. Increasing EIP leads to a higher chance that such
data would be purchased at a higher price. This explains the slight
decrease in MRP of SIP. Since SIP-T does not rely on EIP to stop
buying a data point, its MRP does not change. Recall of SIP and SIP-
T remain comparable to FPC-1 and FMC-2 while spent significant
less. The result from the minimum customer threshold n0 and the
profit per user β show that SIP and SIP-T can give consistent and
high results for different profit model parameters.
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Figure 5: The effect of the gross margin per user β
5.7 The effect of query parameters and user’s
data
5.7.1 The target region L. Figure 6 shows the effect of the size L
of the target region. Because the difference between values of ARP
and MRP for different values of the size L is large, ARP is shown
as the ratio to ARP of Oracle and MRP is shown on a logarithmic
scale. With a larger region (i.e. a higher value of L), the buyer can
gain more users, resulting in a higher profit in general. When the
region size is very large (e.g. L = 10,000), all algorithms achieve
comparable ARP. However, when L becomes smaller, SIP and SIP-T
can maintain good performance while other methods suffer. Also,
when L gets smaller, with a uniform probability, the probability of
a data point being inside a region also becomes smaller. This makes
PoI exclude many data points from buying, which may eventually
not buy any data points and have a 0 recall. SIP and SIP-T, again,
can maintain good ARP and recall while spent significantly less.
5.7.2 The scale d of users’ privacy distributions. Figure 7 shows
the effect of the scale d of the users’ privacy distributions. In all
metrics, performance tends to decrease when the scale increases,
because the FMC-based algorithms would obtain noisier data for
the same price, and SIP and SIP-T would need to spend more to
obtain the same level of accuracy of a data point. For PoI, a lower
value ofd make it more likely to buy a data point, since the expected
profit gain would be higher, hence, it would spend more to buy
data, resulting in a lower MRP; and vice versa.
5.8 The effect of algorithmic parameters
5.8.1 The starting price q0. Figure 8 shows the effect of the starting
price q0. Because it is not preferable to spend a large amount during
the pure exploration phase, the starting price is set to small values.
While SIP-T uses the starting price, it eventually aims to distin-
guish whether a data point is inside or outside the target region.
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Figure 6: The effect of the size L of the target region
Therefore, as long as the starting price is relatively small, the change
of the starting price does not have significant effect to the perfor-
mance of SIP-T. However, for SIP, there is a small change in ARP
since with a higher starting price, it can obtain more accurate data
to make more accurate open/cancel decisions. However, it would
decrease its MRP, which reflects the total cost of buying data. On
the other hand, a very small value of q0 may result in too noisy data
points at the beginning and can negatively effect the performance
of SIP. Since SIP-T is more stable to the change of q0, it is more
preferable if one is willing to spend more budget for buying data.
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Figure 7: The effect of the scaled of the privacy distributions
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Figure 8: The effect of the starting price q0
5.8.2 The price increment factor h. Figure 9 shows the effect of the
price increment factor h. For both SIP and SIP-T, a higher value of h
means that they would skip calculating EIP of a potential price more
often. This can decrease ARP but probably for different reasons:
SIP may incorrectly stop buying a data point, resulting in a higher
MRP because it might spend less; on the other hand, SIP-T may
purchase data points at a too high price, resulting in a lower MRP
because it might spend more.
With a smaller value of h, SIP may spend more on uninformative
purchases, because the standard deviation of the next purchase may
not be different enough from the current purchase, thus, increasing
the total amount spent (i.e. a lower MRP). While both SIP and SIP-T
spendmore, SIP-T performs better than SIP with a small value of the
factor h, because it can make more accurate open/cancel decisions.
1.5 2 3.5 5
SIP 265 124 54 38
SIP-T 163 100 59 48
Table 1: The average execution time (in seconds) of SIP and
SIP-T for different values of the price increment factor h
A smaller value of h would also result in a longer execution
time of SIP and SIP-T since there would be more potential prices
for which they need to calculate EIPs. Table 1 shows the average
execution time of SIP and SIP-T for different values of h.
6 DISCUSSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
To ease discussion, several simplifying assumptions were made for
the buyer’s profit maximization problem. For example, the privacy
valuation was assumed to be known to the users or parameters of
the profit model of the buyer were known; only a single snapshot of
locations of users or only one buyer with one query was considered.
Even with these simplifications, the buyer’s profit maximization
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Figure 9: The effect of the price increment factor h
problem remains a challenging problem. For example, it can be seen
as a particularly hard instance of POMDP. Future work should look
at other scenarios that may illustrate new nuances to the central
problem. In addition, while the proposed algorithms, SIP and SIP-T,
consistently outperformed the baselines, other algorithms could
also be explored to further optimize the buyer’s decisions.
We also emphasize that the buyer’s profit maximization prob-
lem is only one specific problem used to concretely demonstrate
the broader problem: the spatial privacy pricing problem. For fu-
ture work, we would explore other aspects of the spatial privacy
pricing problem. For example, users’ valuation of their data may
change when they can observe selling and buying actions in a data
marketplace, so we would explore the dynamic of users’ valuation
given the interactions in the marketplace. Other privacy preserving
mechanism or other ways of ensuring privacy beyond adding noise
(e.g. encryption) can also be employed. We would also study further
the role of the marketplace or other types of queries of the buyers.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In a geo-marketplace, users can charge a price for their location
data, and buyers can try to optimize their utility by making intelli-
gent buying decisions. With spatial privacy pricing we introduce the
element of privacy, where a user can charge different prices depend-
ing on how much a particular data point would reveal. We illustrate
this interplay between privacy, utility and price with an example
scenario of a buyer who is considering opening a restaurant. The
restaurant will only be profitable if there are enough people nearby.
With this example, we formalize the privacy and pricing considera-
tions of the seller as well as the buying and utility considerations
of the buyer. The buyer’s reasoning is captured as an incremental
expectation maximization algorithm that accounts, in a principled
way, for the points’ uncertainty, prices and the anticipated profit.
Our formulation results in a new geospatial problem for opti-
mizing a buyer’s decision-making process. Using our formula for
“expected incremental profit”, we introduced two related algorithms
for specifying which location points a buyer should buy at which
prices. The algorithms look for the next best point to buy. Com-
pared with five baseline algorithms, our SIP and SIP-T algorithms
are able to better adapt to the locations and prices of user data.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research that consid-
ers the privacy, utility and price of location data in a unified frame-
work. This is an important step for creating a real geo-marketplace.
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